Of all commercial aviation endeavours, few have had such a lasting impression on the general public as the Concorde project. Seemingly ahead of its time, the supersonic 1960s design was seen by many to be the first of many futuristic jet liners. Capable of flying from London to New York in just 3 hours, it herald a new era for aviation, bringing the world closer together, and inspiring us toward even more ambitious travel possibilities.
So, what happened to the Concorde? Today we look at the ambitious project, and why we suddenly stopped going down this bold path of supersonic air travel.
BACKSTORY
The Concorde project dates back to 1954. Engineer Arnold Hall of the Royal Aircraft Establishment - or RAE - had requested a study into a supersonic transport aircraft. He chose fellow aeronautical engineer Morien Morgan to head-up the exploration. By the following year, their study had determined that supersonic transport aircraft lacked feasibility, that such an aircraft would need short wings - like the F-104 – require a huge amount of fuel, and runways far longer than those in current use.
Not long after, RAE researcher Eric Maskell was taking note of the peculiar nature of the delta wing design. At low speeds, and at high angles-of-attack, a delta wing would produce vortices on the upper surface of the wing. Reducing air pressure, these vortices would increase lift, and thus increase low speed performance. Further research was done by Johanna Weber and Dietrich Kuchemann, who’s findings changed the way designers conceptualised supersonic flight. They noted that a short wingspan could be achieved while retaining low speed performance by extending the delta wing along the fuselage as far as possible. So long as the aircraft’s nose could be kept high during take-off and landing, it would produce the lift necessary to keep it in the air.
Kuchemann presented his findings to Morgan, who immediately knew this would be the key to supersonic transport.
PROGRAM BEGINS
In 1956, Morgan would receive support to continue the program, find partners, and continuing the research. Kuchemann and the team at RAE continued their research in extended delta wing design. What they found was that this design presented an interesting problem; usually in aircraft conceptualisation, the centre of pressure (or lift point) will not exactly align with the centre of gravity. During the design phase, this could be corrected by slightly shifting the position of the wing. But with the stretched-out delta wing planform, this correction was much more difficult. If the centre of lift was forward or aft of the centre of gravity, then it would be up to control surfaces to compensate – alternative designs were needed.
Along with the classic straight edged delta, there was also another in the shape of a gothic arc, and a third in the shape of an ogee (or ogival delta). Balance could be achieved with the ogival delta shape – and this is what was chosen for a future supersonic transport.
By 1962, the British and French were both on-board with the project, though not without some hesitation. From the beginning there had been a sense of unease regarding the cost and efficiency of the project, and now it was looking to cost upwards of 3-billion-pounds in today’s currency. It was amazing that the project kept moving forward. Despite their hesitation, the UK’s entry into the European Economic Community (or EEC, a predecessor to the EU) provided the perfect opportunity to promote the project as a collaborative effort between Britain and France. And this (pardon the pun), is how the project got off the ground.
DEVELOPMENT
During the 1960s, development of the aircraft would occur in conjunction with a sales campaign. Airlines were pitched the benefits of two different aircraft - a short and a long range Concorde. Construction began in 1965, and by 1967 ads were being run, boasting of a potential 350 Concordes flying by 1980. On March 2 1969, Concorde 001 would first take to the skies, and on October 1st would go supersonic for the first time.
Both Concorde 001 from France, and Concorde 002 from England which flew shortly afterwards, would together be presented at the 1969 Paris Air Show. The new design was sleek, futuristic, and capable of transporting passengers across the world in a fraction of the time conventional airliners could. Over the following two years the Concorde would travel around, including to America, the Middle East, and Europe, to market the prototypes.
Yet things did not go so smoothly for the sales team. Despite a lengthy sales campaign, orders were up in the air. There were non-binding options on the table for around 100 aircraft, yet these would not come cheap due to massive cost overruns during development. Each unit had a price tag of 23-million-pounds (over 150-million-pounds today).
To heighten anxiety about the supersonic design was the crash of the Soviet equivalent of the Concorde – the TU-144 – at the 1973 Paris Air Show. Although the Concorde was not directly involved, the perception was that supersonic airliner designs were potentially dangerous.
That same year in October, war between Egypt and Israel broke out, with the Saudis limiting oil exports to western nations perceived to be backing Israel. This oil crises had ripple effects on air travel. The Concorde was expensive to run, tickets were already too expensive for most, and many potential purchasers hesitated due to the mounting risks.
To make matters even worse, the Concorde was comparatively loud. Afterburners were usually necessary on take-off, and given the residential build-up around many commercial airports, this noise concern was important. And during flight there were more concerns.
The Concorde was supposed to travel wherever airlines wished to set up travel routes. However, the United States had placed restrictions on supersonic travel. This was initially perceived as a political act to limit the Concorde’s ability to operate over the country, thus securing the American airline industry from competing European designs. Regardless of intent, it meant that one of the biggest markets - America - was now extremely limited. Similar risks also presented themselves across Europe. If flight routes were limited across the European mainland, then Concorde would either need to fly at subsonic speeds, or find alternate routes, defeating the purpose of the aircraft all together.
During development, it was believed that the Concorde would be competing against an American built supersonic transport. However, in 1971 plans for a Boeing supersonic airliner were cut. The strongest competitor to the Concorde became the Boeing 747. Airlines like Qantas believed the 747 would be cheaper, more efficient, and safer than the supersonic design, and eventually ruled out purchasing the Concorde.
AIRCRAFT IN ACTION
By the time the Concorde program reached capacity to mass produce, almost all of the original buyers had pulled out. Only Air France and British Airways remained. Nevertheless, on January 21st, 1976, the maiden passenger flights of the Concorde would take place. Two would occur simultaneously; one from Heathrow to Bahrain, and one from Paris to Rio de Janeiro. The impressive first scheduled flights helped reinvigorate public interest in the program.
Soon thereafter, Concordes began flying more and more regularly. It was not cheap, with tickets costing far more than a standard flight. The newfound excitement for the program even led to the US partially revoking their ban on the Concorde by allowing it permission to land at certain airports. By 1977 a route opened to Singapore, and soon thereafter from Washington to Mexico. Interest from other nations in the program was also aroused. Across the Atlantic the Concorde was given its own track, in a 15000 foot block to descend and ascend as wished. Given the high speed of Mach 2, and cruising altitude of up to 60000 feet, the aircraft was barely impacted by the changing jet streams which were slowing standard airliners across the Atlantic.
However, these victories were momentary. Economic issues meant that high ticket prices made the flight more of a novelty for the wealthy than a common travel option. Some flights were mostly empty, and on average these aircraft were losing money. In the 1980s, the British government voiced its desire to completely end the program, and the decision was made to sell the Concordes to British Airways outrightly, for practically nothing, a mere £16.5 million.
Over the following years, anxiety surrounding the aircraft increased - largely thanks to the media. The risks of supersonic high-altitude flight were presented to the general public. Various supposed design flaws were highlighted. For example, it was reported that flying above 45000 feet increased the risk of passengers being exposed to ionising radiation, while cabin depressurisation at such an altitude would lead to one losing consciousness within less than 15 seconds. Other supposed issues were also highlighted, including potential engine problems, and airframe fatigue occurring after extended supersonic flight. Reports that degraded confidence, to say the least, in an aircraft already struggling on the economic front.
There was however a moment of hope for the program. After moving into the private sector, the Concorde program came under the analytical scrutiny required to keep the operation afloat and out of the red. British Airways looked at who was currently flying on Concorde, who would potentially fly, and why either of these groups would choose to fly Concorde. This basic data - which should have been defined earlier - found that most people thought that Concorde tickets were more expensive than they were. They also discovered most customers were business travellers - not those on holidays or other private travel. Thus, ticket prices were increased to match consumer perception, becoming slightly more than subsonic first-class tickets at 4700 pounds. The focus was also shifted towards a corporate audience, and this would become the staple for the Concorde. From the 1980s onward, Concorde would become profitable for British Airways. In fact, over the next 20 years, British Concordes would make over half a billion dollars in ticket sales, while only operating 5 aircraft at any one time.
For many involved, the program had been a dream come true. Supersonic air travel for civilians was the goal, and it had been achieved. But many understood that the program’s end was inevitable. The final issues to confront the program would come in the early 2000s. The infamous Air France crash in 2000 played into longstanding fears being circulated by the media and saw a drop in passenger interest in flying on Concorde. Actually, the crash was exceptionally rare; debris on the runway destroyed one of the Concorde’s tyres which flung fragments into the underside of the wing and integral fuel tank. Such an incident - despite the public response - could certainly not have been put down to a fault of the Concorde.
Then, the following year, the September 11 attacks saw a further decrease in air travel. Finally in 2003, both the British and French announced that they would be retiring the Concorde. Thus marked the end of supersonic commercial travel. What was once a dream decades earlier, had been momentarily achieved, but was now to be archived as a remarkable era of our aviation history.
CONCLUSION
Supersonic commercial travel projects like the Concorde and the Tupolev TU-144, have shown us that such travel is not only possible but can be commercially viable. Through a series of unfortunate events, rulings, and media fearmongering, limited the Concorde program from the beginning to end.
Today many people see the Concorde as a futuristic design that had an untimely demise, and that supersonic passenger travel is still something we should be aiming for. Lockheed Martin’s X-59 project may be one of those steps toward an eventual return to supersonic commercial air travel. Perhaps, if interest is reinvigorated, and politics is kept to a minimum, then supersonic transport will make a return in the future.