The Rockwell B-1A

The B-1B Lancer has long been one of the most capable bomber aircraft ever produced. Able to fly supersonic (and at extremely low altitudes), deliver large quantities of weapons with pinpoint precision, the Lancer has been proven in several conflicts.

However, the B-1 bomber we know today was never designed to operate in the manner it does today. The Lancer evolved from a long history of experimental supersonic bomber designs to serve a very distinct stop-gap task. Today we'll look back at the original Lancer, the Rockwell B-1A, which never saw duty but helped lay the road for the B-1B we know today.

BACKGROUND

The concept of developing a high-altitude, long-range bomber with supersonic capabilities gained traction in the late 1950s. At the time, the true strength of surface-to-air missiles was unknown, and the assumption was that the quicker and higher an aircraft could fly, the less vulnerable it would be to air defences.

In the mid 1950s, the B-58 Hustler became the first bomber to be able to operate faster than Mach 2. Even before its introduction, however, plans were underway for an even faster, larger aircraft. In 1955, the US Air Force had requested concepts for an aircraft able to outperform both the B-58 and the B-52 in terms of speed, range, and payload. A proposal was put on the table -  the B-70, a huge long-range bomber, faster than the B-58 and with larger stores capacities then the B-52.

Initially referred to as the XB-70 Valkyrie, this new aircraft proved capable of exceeding previous flight records for a bomber. It could travel faster than Mach 3, almost as fast as the SR-71, while operating at a height of up to 77,000 feet.

However, in 1960, the aircraft's promising characteristics was called into question. The downing of a U-2 that year highlighted the increasingly dangerous threat of surface-to-air missiles. For the B-70 program, this would mean disaster. The B-70 was built to operate at high altitudes, but the Air Force realized that low-level operations will be required to counter the threat of increasingly sophisticated SAM systems. In 1961, President Kennedy cancelled the B-70 program, relegating the prototype aircraft to experimental research flights, and attention was redirected towards low level, all weather, fast bomber systems.

In the early 1960s, is new type of bomber was realised in the General Dynamics F-111. Designed for Air Force and Navy, this aircraft was all-weather capable, supersonic, featured an advanced terrain following radar, and could potentially carry four times the payload of an F-4 Phantom. While the F-111 had several flaws, which led to its rejection by the Navy, it did fulfil the role decisions makers were looking for. It proved that a low-level supersonic strike aircraft was possible, albeit with a hefty price tag.

During this period - the early 60s - the Air Force began searching for a concept similar to the F-111, but larger; something that could take over from the B-52, but without the drawbacks of the B-70. Several programs were started, involving a variety of aeronautics companies. The culmination of this effort was the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (or AMSA) study in October 1963, which had the goal of essentially replicating the F-111 capabilities in a larger bomber design.

By this time, optimism for a next generation bomber fleet was waning. Many researchers, and designers alike, believed that bombers were becoming too dangerous and too slow. ICBMs were increasingly fast and accurate - exemplified in designs such as the “Minuteman 3” - and lacked the drawbacks inherent in a fleet of bombers. Robert McNamara - the secretary of defence - had similar feelings. His solution: upgrade the B-52 fleet and begin wider production of FB-111s.

In 1969, however, this would all change. Under President Nixon’s administration, the AMSA program was reinvigorated, and in November that year a request for proposals was sent out. By January 1970 three major players had responded: Boeing, General Dynamics, and North American (later North American Rockwell). Of the three, North Americans proposal was chosen, and in June that year the green light was given to develop a working prototype of the new aircraft, now designated B-1A.

DEVELOPMENT HISTORY

North American would change its name to Rockwell International. Rockwell would then receive direction from the Air Force to produce four test aircraft: one ground test and three flyable prototype airframes.

What Rockwell was developing would share many similarities with its predecessors, especially the F-111. It would feature variable geometry wings to aide in high and low altitude performance. It would feature a crew escape module in the case of emergency ejection. A huge fuel capacity meant that supersonic flight at low altitudes could be held for long periods of time, and better still the aircraft could operate from shorter runways than the B-52.

Initially - if budget permitted - the B-1A would be able to fly at Mach 1.2 on the deck, thanks to variable geometry intakes and engine nozzles, as well as small vanes on the nose to smooth out what would otherwise be a very bumpy ride. Titanium would be used to reinforce critical parts of the airframe to permit extreme vibrations and forces which the aircraft would face at such speeds. At high altitudes it was a similar story. The B-1A would be capable of achieving speeds beyond Mach 2.

In October 1971, the B-1A would be put under scrutiny as the first mock-up test of the aircraft was held. Almost three hundred changes were requested to meet certain requirements, for which the prototype had fallen short. But nevertheless, the aircraft had great potential, albeit at a large cost. In 1971 it was expected to cost $40 million USD per unit. At the time, Air Force analysts had hoped to see 240 of the aircraft produced and ready for operation by 1979. This optimistic outlook would prove impossible.

As time went on, inflation began to take its toll on the program. A number of economic issues plagued the US from 1972 onwards, and this meant all non-essential programs were under the microscope. The B-1A would feel the repercussions of this; to cut costs, the expensive titanium components were culled, limiting the aircrafts low altitude speed to around Mach 0.8. The crew ejection module would also be ditched and replaced with conventional ejection seats; quite the risk given the speed of the aircraft.

Nevertheless, the project was still moving forward. On December 23^rd, 1974, the B-1A would take its maiden flight. This aircraft - which had rolled off the line at Palmdale California - was flown to Edwards Air Force base by Rockwell test pilots Charlie Brock, Colonel Emil Sturmthal and Richard Abrams. This now working aircraft was powered by four General Electric F101-100 engines, placed close to the aircrafts centre of gravity to further offset any turbulence effects which would be felt at low altitude. It would seat four crew members; a pilot, copilot, and two officers to handle defensive and offensive systems. The aircrafts gear folded up under the wing roots, and internally it featured three weapons bays, roughly 15 feet in length each. 25,000 pounds of weapons could be stored in each, and suggestions were made to further increase this capacity. This gave the B-1A almost twice the weapons capacity of a standard B-52.

The third aircraft to roll off the line was to be the avionics testbed, taking its first flight on March 26, 1976. The avionics suite installed in the aircraft was, at the time, one of the most complex systems arrays ever developed for an aircraft, which influenced its price and manufacturing complexity. Nevertheless, in December 1976 the decision was made to move the B-1A program into Phase 2, with a request for eight to be delivered for further research purposes, with the ambitious initial goal of producing 240 fully serviceable bombers being pushed back beyond 1979. During this early period, the original batch of phase 1 aircraft wore a distinct anti-flash white camo, reminiscent of the XB-70, and today seen on the Russian TU-160, although it is likely the B-1A was only intended to wear its bright paint for its prototyping phase.

END OF PROGRAM

Despite its potential, the B-1A once again came under scrutiny. By 1975 the aircraft was expected to cost over $70 million per unit, almost double the original expected price. What’s more, the long development process behind the design had dragged it into a new era of air combat. Both the US and the Soviets were pivoting towards more advanced multirole fighter and interceptor aircraft, with better radars and onboard computer systems than those around during the initial conception of the B-1A. Notably, when MiG-25 pilot Viktor Belenko defected to Japan in 1976, he detailed how the Soviet’s next interceptor - the MiG-31 Foxhound - would be able to find and track low flying targets on radar with a level of ease not previously seen. This new MiG would also be Mach 3 capable, even at altitude the B-1A could not outrun such an aircraft.

These strategic military issues soon became mainstream. During the 1976 presidential election cycle, Jimmy Carter made the B-1 project one of the Democratic Parties talking points, claiming that the program would be a colossal waste of taxpayer dollars. By 1977, the Carter administration had reviewed the program, and found that development costs had ballooned even higher. The final nail in the coffin, however, would be a future program. Carter was informed of a new stealth bomber under production and that the new AGM-86 cruise missile could be launched in the hundreds by a squadron of older B-52s, allowing conventional bombers to saturate enemy airspace with small, hard to pinpoint, explosive warheads which could travel very far.

Subsequently, on June 30^th, 1977, Carter announced that the B-1A program would officially end. In its place would be the B-52 cruise missile upgrade programs, and further funding for ICBM systems. Importantly, the new stealth bomber - part of the Advanced Technology Bomber project - would eventually be completed; an aircraft which was claimed to be able to strike with precision with near-zero risk.

The controversial decision to cancel the B-1A would resonate for some years. Immediately following the announcement, two contradictory, but telling, opinions emerged; American DOD personnel believed that the cancellation lent strength to the Soviets. The Soviets on the other hand clearly feared the cruise missiles more; Russian media at the time perceived the American decision to mass produce cruise missiles as Carter’s attempt to undo Nixon’s peace efforts between the East and West.

Even after cancellation, the remaining prototypes would continue limited flying for research purposes. The B-1A was clearly an incredible aircraft. During one flight on October 5^th, 1978, it was recorded reaching Mach 2.22 at altitude, a speed unmatched by any other B-1 to this day by a significant margin. However, for several years the B-1 program would slowly fade into the background.

B-1B PROGRAM

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, conversations about methods of defence were reinvigorated. In 1980, president-elect Ronald Reagan once again bought up the B-1 program, speaking about it in positive terms and suggesting that its cancellation was an unfortunate decision, and such an aircraft would be beneficial in the type of war the Soviets were now fighting in the Middle East.

Reagan began reassessing the program as soon as he was in office. His advisors suggested that this new stealth bomber - which would become the B-2 Spirit - was still years away. They believed the B-1A could be modernised and put into production for service way before the promised stealth bomber. Thus, the decision was made to re-ignite the program.

In 1982, Rockwell was awarded over $2 billion to begin upgrading and then producing 100 new B-1s. These new versions would need to have a lowered radar cross section, bigger weapons stores capacity, higher speed at low altitude, and an electronic countermeasure suite. It would be going up against several new threats; namely the newly introduced MiG-31, and the SA-10 SAM system.

Now with the working name of B-1B, designers improved stores capacity from 395,000 pounds to 477,000 pounds. The aircrafts intakes were modified, from variable geometry to fixed. This halved its high-altitude speed to Mach 1.2 but increased its low-level speed from Mach 0.8 to Mach 0.95. Its outward appearance would also change slightly, becoming more rounded and in turn producing a smaller radar cross section, thanks partially to serpentine intake ducts. And with all this, the B-1B would still be able to operate from smaller air bases than the B-52.

By this time, two of the B-1As had been retired, and the others were still sitting around, now painted in a desert camo. Three of the initial four B-1As would be cleaned up and modified to include B-1B systems for testing, while fully original production prototypes of the B-1B were also being manufactured. In March 1983, the converted B-1Bs would be used for flight testing, and on October 18^th the following year, the first production B-1B would take its maiden flight.

The original B-1As would see activity during this period. Now painted in a dark low visibility scheme mimicking the early dark green camo on the first B-1Bs, these aircraft were crucial in providing both testbeds for new technology.

Still a controversial topic in Washington at the time, the B-1B program was in full swing during the 1980s, and by 1988 the 100^th airframe - the final to be produced - rolled off the production line.

The B-1B would go on to serve in several conflicts around the world, and after several decades is still in service. Rather than being a mere stop-gap solution while awaiting the delivery of the B-2 Spirit, the B-1B has taken on a unique role of its own. Faster and more versatile than the B-52, and less of a risk to deploy than the costly B-2, the B-1B has become a useful tool in counterinsurgency warfare, and it seems that it will continue in this manner for many years.

CONCLUSION

There are several plans to phase out the B-1B in the coming years, but until then it will remain a serious deterrent against opponents. The Lancers success rests on the original B-1A design; a seriously impressive aircraft for its time, and one which, in some ways, outperformed its successor, yet never had the opportunity to prove itself. Fifty years since its maiden flight in 1974, the B-1A may never receive the recognition of its successor, but it remains a sleek, technologically impressive design - and surely ahead of its time.